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The Federal Common Law of 
Patent Licensing 
The Constitution and Congressional leg-
islation grant certain exclusive rights to 
inventors of new and useful articles. This 
collection of rights is known as a United 
States patent.! For a limited time these 
inventors can use their rights to seek a 
return for the sweat and money that they 
invested in the invention by excluding all 
others from making, using or selling their . 
invention. 
There are several profit making options 
available to the owner of a patent: 
(1) The patent owner may manufacture 
and market the invention himself, exclu-
ding competition and accumulating the 
profits as a result of the lack of competi-
tion; or 
(2) The patent owner may sell the 
patent, and the rights that go with it out-
right, eliminating the risk and work 
involved in the marketing of the product;2 
or 
(3) The patent owner can contractually 
authorize others to use all or part of the 
patent in exchange for the payment of 
royalties. These licensing and payment 
arrangements may assume any number of 
configurations. The patent owner may 
authorize the use of the patent to a 
number of licensees, which is called a non-
exclusive license, or may limit the use to 
one sole licensee, which is called an exclu-
sive license.3 The patent owner may 
license just one or any combination of the 
rights which the patent grants. The licen-
sor may also restrict the extent of the use 
by the licensee.4 
Such licenses are contracts.5 Because con-
tracts are generally governed by state law, 
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one could conclude that patent licenses are 
governed by state law. Absent express fed-
eral statute·s on point, this is generally the 
case. At times, however, a patent owner's 
freedom of contract may be preempted.by 
policy considerations of the federal patent 
system. 
There is a growing collection of federal 
cases addressing patent licensing contracts 
which do not apply the substantive law of 
the forum state, but instead apply federal 
common law. 
Section I of this article discusses the sub-
stantive law to be applied in patent licens-
ing cases and the principles and sources of 
federal common law. Section II presents 
the development of the federal policy 
upon which the federal common law of 
patent licensing relies for its authority. 
The next two sections present an analysis 
of some of the Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit cases which establish the federal 
common law of patent licensing. The fifth 
section briefly discusses the proposed fed-
eral legislation which would codify some 
of the principles of the federal common 
law of patent licensing. 
I 
COMMON IA W OF CONTRACTS-
FEDERAL OR STATE? 
When Mr. Tompkins bumped into a 
train in Pennsylvania and sued the train 
company in a New York court, the 
Supreme Court of the United States6 held 
that: (a) unless the matter is governed by 
the u.S. Constitution or federal statutes, 
federal courts must apply the applicable 
state law; (b) neither Congress nor the fed-
eral courts have the power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable to 
a state; and (c) there is no general federal 
common law. Thus, when exercising 
jurisdiction based upon diversity of citi-
zenship, federal courts must apply state 
substantive law. This means that state law, 
whether legislative or judicial in origin, is 
to be applied to issues concerning the 
validity, revocability and enforceability of 
contracts.? The states are free to regulate 
the use of intellectual property in any 
manner not inconsistent with federal law 
on the subject; state law is not displaced 
merely because the contract relates to 
intellectual property. Where a federal 
court acquires jurisdiction of a dispute 
involving a patent license based upon a 
diversity of citizenship, the federal court 
must look to the law of the state in which 
the court sits. Federal patent law is not 
applicable in actions for the breach of a 
patent license.8 
While Erie told us that there is no gener-
al federal common law - no national com-
mon law in the United States distinct from 
the common law which each state has 
adopted for iteslf9 - it did not say that there 
is no common law in force generally 
throughout the United States. There still 
exists the need and authority in limited 
areas for federal courts to develop what 
has come to be known as "federal com-
mon law."!O Federal common law exists in 
those areas where Congress has given the 
courts the power to develop substantive 
law or where the rights, obligations or 
interests of the United States are intimate-
ly involved. 11 When there is an overriding 
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federal interest in the need for a uniform 
rule of decision, the federal courts will 
fashion federal common law.12 
The Constitution and the federal statutes 
dealing with a general subject are the 
prime sources of federal policy on the sub-
ject and may also be viewed as a starting 
point for ascertaining the federal common 
lawY Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the 
Constitution and the Federal Patent Act14. 
foster the federal patent policy. 
IT 
FEDERAL PATENT POLICY 
The federal patent system was set up to 
"promote the progress of ... the useful 
arts by securing for limited times to ... 
inventors the exclusive right to their .,. 
discoveries;"15 requiring the full and free 
competition in the use of ideas which are 
a part of the public domain, while allow-
ing limited rights of exclusion for subject 
matter of United States patents. 16 The pur-
pose of the system is: (1) to foster and 
reward invention; (2) to promote the dis-
closure of inventions to stimulate further 
innovations and to permit the public to 
practice the invention once the patent 
expires; and (3) to delineate the stringent 
requirements for patent protection to 
assure that ideas in the public domain 
remain there for the free use of the public. 
The requirements for obtaining a patent 
are strictly observed, and when the patent 
has been issued the limitation on its exer-
cise are equally strictly enforced. 17 
The federal courts will not hesitate to 
completely override established state law 
as it applies to the licensing of U.S. patents 
when the judiciary believes that such laws 
inhibit or conflict with the public policy 
of the patent system. 18 The courts have 
gone so far as to hold the Erie Doctrine l9 
inapplicable to those areas of judicial deci-
sion in which the policy of the law is so 
dominated by the sweep of federal statutes 
that legal relations in those areas must be 
deemed as governed by federallaw.20 The 
Seventh Circuit in UNARCO Industries, 
Inc. v. Kelly Company, 21 held that: 
[a] patent monopoly conferred by fed-
eral statute as well as the policy perpet-
uating this monopoly, so effects the 
licensing of patents, and the policy 
behind such licensing is so intertwined 
with the sweep of federal statutes, that 
any question with respect [to a patent 
license] must be governed by federal 
law.22 
In intellectual property, as in other 
fields, the question of whether state law is 
preempted by federal law "involves a con-
sideration of whether [the state] law stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purpose and objec-
tives of Congress."23 If it does not, the 
state law governs. 
m 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
OF LICENSING 
A.LEAR,INCv.ADKINS 
The landmark decision of Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins24 held that private patent licensing 
contracts between individuals, with or 
without the approval of the State, cannot 
be allowed to frustrate "federal patent 
policy ."25 In section III of its opinion, the 
Court disregarded the Erie Doctrine and 
reviewed the "competing demands" of 
common law contracts and federal patent 
law and ruled in favor of federal law ,26 bur-
ying the "general rule" of licensee estoppel 
that had been a vital doctrine for over 
ninety years,27 and preempting the com-
mon law of contracts. 
In Lear, an engineer named John Adkins 
was hired by Lear in January, 1952 to help 
them invent a better gyroscope. Mr. 
Adkins succeeded and filed a patent 
application in February, 1954. In Septem-
ber, 1955, Lear and Akins executed a for-
mal licensing agreement for the use of 
Adkins' gyroscopes. In 1957, Adkins had 
yet to receive a patent on his invention and 
"purpose of the 
system ... foster 
and reward 
invention ... " 
so Lear stopped royalty payments to 
Adkins on the large number of gyroscopes 
being producing in its plant in Michigan. 
Lear's action was based upon research 
which revealed that the Adkins' invention 
had been fully anticipated. Two years 
later, in April, 1959,28 Lear terminated 
royalty payments on the smaller number 
of gyroscopes it was producing in its Cali-
fornia plant.29 In January, 1960, Adkins 
was issued a patent on a narrowed claim. 
Adkins immediately brought a lawsuit in 
the California Superior Court for breach 
of contract. Lear tried to raise patent inva-
lidity as a defense but the court held that 
the company was estopped from bringing 
an invalidity defense because of its position 
as a licensee. This decision was affirmed by 
the holding of the California Supreme 
Court30 and reversed by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
This far reaching and potentially con-
troversial decision of the Supreme Couit 
held that: (a) a licensee is not estopped to 
contest the validity of a licensed patent; (b) 
the licensor can not enforce the royalty 
provision of the contract; and, (c) upon 
proving invalidity of the licensed patent, a 
licensee is released from its royalty obliga-
tions retroactively from the date that the 
patent was issued.31 The rationale for this 
decision is based upon federal patent 
policy. 
1. LICENSEE ESTOPPEL 
Before the Lear decision, the doctrine of 
licensee estoppel had been valid law for 
more than one hundred years.J2 The doc-
trine states that a licensee was prevented 
from challenging the validity of the 
patents under which he was licensed. Two 
Supreme Court decisions established 
licensee estoppel as the general rule. In 
United States v. Harvey Stee~ 33 there was a 
provision in a licensing document with the 
government that provided for the termina-
tion of royalties if the licensed patent was 
invalidated. The Court rejected the 
government's defense of patent invalidity 
in a suit by the patent owner to collect 
royalty payments, stating: 
[T]he United States [cannot] set up the 
invalidity of the patent in this suit .... 
The [royalty termination] proviso was 
inserted, no doubt, on the assumption 
that licensee, when sued for royalties, 
is estopped to deny the validity of the 
patent which he has been using, and to 
give him the benefit of litigation by or 
against third persons, notwithstanding 
that rule. 34 
Again in Automatic Radio /tfjg. Co. v. 
Hazeltine Research Inc.,35 the Court stated 
the "general rule is that the licensee under 
a patent license agreement may not chal-
lenge the validity of the licensed patent in 
a suit for royalties due under the con-
tract."36 
The Court in Lear held that the doctrine 
of licensee estoppel was "so eroded" that 
it could no longer be the general rule. The 
Court ruled that the doctrine should only 
be invoked in a narrow set of cir-
cumstancesY The Court weighed the 
competing demands of the common law of 
contracts, which would forbid the repudia-
tion of a subsequently unsatisfactory bar-
gain,38 against the federal law of patents, 
which requires that all ideas in general cir-
culation be dedicated to the common good 
unless they are protected by a valid 
patent.39 Finding a true balance imp os-
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sible, the Court shifted the scales towards 
the side of the licensee and "federal patent 
policy": "Surely the equities of the licen-
sor do not weigh heavily when they are 
balanced against the important public 
interest in permitting full and free com-
petition in the use of ideas which are in 
reality a part of the public domain."40 
Common law contract was overwhelmed 
by "federal patent policy" and licensee 
estoppel was dead and properly buried.41 
2. ROYALTIES 
The Lear Court then proceeded to 
decide whether federal patent policy 
would be frustrated if the licensee was 
required to make royalty payments 
pendente lite. That was a question which 
the Court had not been asked to answer. 
Section 6 of the 1955 agreement between 
Lear and Adkins provided for the payment 
of royalties until such time as the "patent 
. . . is held invalid."42 When weighed 
against the overriding federal policies, the 
Court held that this section of the parties' 
contract had no authority and was unen-
forceable. The Court stated that enforcing 
the contract and requiring the payment of 
royalties during the time the validity of the 
patent was being challenged in the courts 
would be inconsistent with the aims of fed-
eral patent policy.H The Court went on to 
hold that a licensor is prohibited from 
judicially recovering all royalties accruing 
after the issuance of the patent if the 
licensee proves the license is invalid. 
Ruling the other way would have 
"[given] the licensor an additional 
economic incentive to devise every con-
ceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to 
postpone the day of final judicial reckon-
ing."H The effect of the alternative rule 
would have been to replace the "muzzle," 
discouraging the licensee to challenge .the 
validity of the patent, which the Court 
had just removed when it eliminated the 
doctrine of licensee estoppel. 45 
The Court's ruling gave the licensee the 
right to cease royalty payments at the time 
it challenged the licensor's patent; and, it 
deprived the licensor's right to enforce the 
licensing agreement and recover the 
unpaid royalties if the patent was ultimate-
ly declared invalid. The Court refused to 
rule on the situation of royalties paid 
before the patent issued. 
IV 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
COMMON LAW OF LICENSING 
A. WHAT TO DO WITH 
ROYALTIES? • Cordis Corporation v. 
Medtronic, Inc. 46 
The Federal Circuit recently answered 
several of the questions left unanswered by 
Lear.47 In Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 48 
Cordis filed suit in district court asking for 
a declaratory judgment that the two 
patents it licensed from Medtronic were 
invalid.49 Cordis also moved for the court 
to order the establishment of an escrow 
account into which Cordis would deposit 
royalty payments due Medtronic pendente 
lite and sought a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin Medtronic from terminating the 
licensing agreement for failure to make 
royalty payments during the pendency of 
the patent invalidity suit.50 The district 
court granted the injunction and ordered 
the establishment of an escrow account. 
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded 
the district court's decision. 
"the court intimates 
that it might allow 
an escrow 
t " accoun ... 
The Federal Circuit found "no authori-
ty in Lear51 for establishing an escrow 
account for royalties due pendente lite or 
preliminarily enjoining a licensor from 
cancelling the license agreement and, thus, 
from counterclaiming for patent infringe-
ment when [a] material breach of the 
license occurs."52 Cordis and a number of 
district court decisions argued that with 
such a decision: 
[t]he speed and efficiency gained by 
permitting the licensee to suspend 
royalty payments would surely be lost 
if nonpayment meant termination of a 
license. [T]he threat of termination 
would discourage the withholding of 
royalties because . . . termination 
would lay the licensee open to possibly 
substantial liability for damages for 
infringement and an injunction against 
future use of the product whose pat-
entability had been successfully estab-
lished. Since few licensees will run the 
risk, to permit the licensor to ter-
minate the license agreement because 
of nonpayment would enable it to 
achieve indirectly what it quite 
obviously cannot obtain directly - spe-
cific performance of the provision 
requiring payment.53 
The Cordis court, citing the Second Cir-
cuit in WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Allied 
Chemical COrp.,54 and the Eighth Circuit 
in Nebraska Engineering Corp. v. Shiv· 
vers,55 held that the federal patent policy 
encouraging prompt adjudication of 
patent validity56 permits a licensee to cease 
royalty payments during the patent invali-
dity suit but does not permit the licensee 
to avoid the consequences of such a 
breach. A licensee cannot enjoy the securi-
ty of a licensing agreement 57 without mak-
ing payments required under the 
agreement. If the challenging licensee does 
not want to risk forfeiture of the royalties 
paid while litigating the validity of the 
patent(s), the consequences of non-
payment, termination of the agreement 
and exposure to a potential patent infringe-
ment suit must be accepted. In dicta, the 
court intimates that it might allow an 
escrow account if the licensee could show 
that the licensor was financially irresponsi-
ble or might be judgment-proof at the end 
of litigation.58 
Cordis, the licensee, argued that absent 
the injunctive relief it asked for, it would 
suffer irreparable harm by forfeiting any 
royalties paid pendente lite. The court dis-
tinguished the authority Cordis cited59 as 
only prohibiting recovery of royalties paid 
by the licensee when the challenge of the 
patent was made by a third party. The 
court, however, made no decision as to 
which party would be entitled to royalties 
paid or accrued pendente lite should the 
patent be held invalid.60 
B. THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT 
1. Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v. 
ERWA Exercise Equipment Ltd.61 
The most recent federal case applying 
the Erie Doctrine to a patent licensing 
action came out of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in September, 1987. 
In Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v. 
ER WA Exercise Equipment Ltd.,62 the Fed-
eral Circuit held that patent law does not 
preclude applications of state contract law 
to provide relief for the breach of a patent 
licensing contract. The plaintiff, Univer-
sal, and the defendants, ER W A and its sub-
sidiary Global, manufacture and sell 
weight lifting machines. Universal and 
ER W A entered into a licensing agreement 
in 1972 allowing ER W A to manufacture, 
market and sell Universal machines in 
Canada under Universal's trademark in 
return for the payment of royalties. The 
agreement contained a clause prohibiting 
ERWA from using any features, designs, 
technical information or said know-how 
of the Universal equipment in any future 
manufacturing activities after a termina-
tion of the contract.63 The day after 
Universal terminated the agreement, 
Global began making and selling exercise 
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machines which Universal claimed in-
fringed upon its patent. The district court 
found that Global's machines did not in-
fringe; however, the court also ruled that 
the defendants had breached the 1972 agree-
ment and awarded damages to Universal. 
On appeal, Global argued that the dis-
trict court improperly upheld the agree-
ment contrary to the doctrine set out by 
the Supreme Court in Sea~ Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffil CO.,64 and Compeo Corp. v. Dtry-
Brite Lighting, Inc. 6S In its argument 
Global stated "that when a publicly 
available article is unprotected by a patent 
or copyright, state law may not f0rbid 
others from making that article."66 
Global also asserted that the holdings of 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bkron COrp.,67 and 
Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 68 support the argument 
that federal patent law preempts state law 
that grants equivalent protection. The 
court held that the application of state law 
upholding the contract, which contained a 
provision for relief for a breach of the con-
tract, did not conflict with federal law. 69 
The court found that Global's argument 
applied those cases too broadly; the only 
broad language in these cases that would 
support the argument was taken out of 
context. Focusing on the facts and the 
holdings of Sea~ Compeo and Lear, the 
court distinguished the present case. The 
rationale of Sears and Compeo was that 
patent law has prerequisites and limita-
tions for the granting of a patent. 
To allow a state by use of its laws of 
unfair competition to prevent the cop-
ying of an article which represents too 
slight an advance to [meet the prereq-
uisites] and be patented would be to 
permit the state to block off from the 
public something which federal law 
said belongs to the public.70 
Sears and Compeo involved the compatibil-
ity of federal patent law and the applica-
tion of state unfair competition law to pre-
vent copying of an unpatented product of 
a company that had no contractual rela-
tions with the copier.71 The issue in 
Universal was the validity of the contract 
between the parties and the contract's 
compatability, not the state law under 
which the contract was created, with feder-
al patent law. 
The court went on to address the 
relevance of the holding in Lear,72 that in 
order to eliminate the threat to the free use 
of ideas already in the public domain 
which an invalid patent represents, a 
patent licensee is not estopped from chal-
lenging the validity of the licensed patent. 
The issue before the Supreme Court in 
Lear involved a question totally unrelated 
to the issue in Universal73 The only 
applicable case Global cited was 
Kewana!, 74 where the Supreme Court held 
that federal patent law did not preempt 
state trade secret law and the remedies it 
provides for breach of a confidential agree-
ment. In the present case, the Court distin-
guished the question "whether the patent 
law precludes the application of state law 
to validate and award damages for a 
licensee's breach" of a contract, from the 
question raised in Sears and Compco, 
whether relief under a state's unfair com-
petition law for copying an unpatented 
article is barred by federal patent law.75 
This court's decision affirmed the power 
that the licensor and licensee have to con-
tract, to limit their right to take action 
they would otherwise have had. Such a 
private contract is nullified by the 
Sears/Compeo doctrine only if enforce-
ment of the contract would conflict with 
federal patent policy. Since their is no con-
flict in applying state law to provide 
damages for a breach of the agreement, 
patent law does not preclude the applica-
tion of state law.76 
2. Aronson v. Quick Point 
Pencil Company77 
The Universal court cites Aronson v. 
Quick Point Pencil CO./8 as authority for 
applying state law which uphold the right 
of the parties in a contract to limit their 
rights to take action. Relying on Kewanee 
Oi~ the Court in Quick Point held that the 
states were free to regulate the use of 
intellectual property that "I?ay or may 
HKewanee ... held 
that federal patent 
law did not preempt 
state trade secret 
l " aw ... 
not be patentable."79 In Quick Point, an 
inventor, Ms. Aronson, had exclusively 
licensed her invention, a key holder which 
had yet to be patented,80 to the Quick 
Point Pencil Co. for its manufacture and 
sale. The royalty payments provided for in 
the contract started at a rate of five percent 
of the selling price per item but were to be 
reduced to two and one-half percent, if, 
within five years, a patent for the key 
holder was not granted. The Patent Office 
did not issue a patent within the five year 
period81 and Quick Point reduced its 
royalty payments accordingly. Quick 
Point continued to pay the reduced royal-
ties for fourteen years; however, when 
sales began to decline from competition 
Quick Point brought suit to have the 
royalty agreement declared unenforceable. 
The Court upheld the agreement because 
the agreement did not conflict with federal 
patent policy.82 
Permitting inventors to make 
enforceable agreements licensing the use of 
their invention in return for royalties in 
fact provides additional incentive to 
invent,8) and, as in this case, does not with-
draw ideas from the public domain. The 
idea was not in the public domain when 
Quick Point obtained the license; it was 
Quick Point's exploitation that placed the 
idea there. Enforcing the agreement would 
not prevent anyone from copying the key 
holder; it merely requires Quick Point to 
pay the consideration which it promised in 
return for the use of the new device ena· 
bling it to preempt the market.84 The 
Court found that enforcement of this royal-
ty agreement was consistent with its earlier 
case, Brulotte v. Thys CO.85 In Brulotte, it 
was held that an obligation to pay royalties 
in exchange for the use of a patented device 
may not extend beyond the life of a patent. 
The principle underlying this theory was 
that someone may not use the leverage of a 
patent monopoly to negotiate royalty pay-
ments beyond the life of the monopoly.86 
In Quick Point, no "patent leverage" was 
used. In fact, the extended payment plan 
was contingent upon no patent issuing. The 
Court stated that: 
[e]nforcement of these contractual 
obligations, freely undertaken in 
arm's-length negotiation and with no 
fixed reliance on a patent or a probable 
patent grant will 'encourage invention 
in areas where patent law does not 
reach, and will prompt the inde-
pendent innovator to proceed with the 
discovery and exploitation of his 
invention. Competition is fostered and 
the public is not deprived of the use of 
valuable, if not quite patentable, inven-
tion.'87 
Allowing an inventor to negotiate royalty 
payments from a manufacturer for the 
opportunity to be the first in the market is 
not barred by federal patent policy.88 
The apparent key to the situation, when 
the application of state law is denied, is to 
see when the enforcement of an agreement 
under state law is inconsistent with the 
purposes of the federal patent system. It is 
the federal policy not to interfere with 
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someone's freedom to contract so long as 
it is clear that the subject matter of the 
contract is not dependent on federally 
granted patent rights, even though the pos-
sibility of patent· rights were secondarily 
involved in the contract. 
v. FEDERAL LEGISlATION 
Federal common law is resorted to in the 
absence of an applicable act of Congress. 
Because a federal court is compelled to 
consider federal questions which cannot be 
answered from federal statutes alone, a fed-
eral court must sometimes apply federal 
common law. But a federal court is subject 
to the dominant authority of Congress. 
When Congress addresses a question previ-
ously governed by a decision resting on 
federal common law the need for such an 
unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal 
courts disappears.89 
In his January, 1987 "State of the Union 
Address," President Reagan announced his 
intention to make proposals to Congress 
to enhance America's competitiveness 
through statutory and regulatory reforms 
and a harder stance against unfair trade 
practices.90 In February, Congress intro-
duced legislation in both houses embracing 
the President's "competitiveness pack-
age." The Omnibus Intellectual Property 
Rights ImprO'lJement Act of 198711 contains 
a number of proposals which would codify 
and eliminate the need for a number of the 
previously discussed cases. 
Section 3106 would add section 296 to 
the Patent Act as stated: 
(a) A licensee shall not be estopped 
from asserting in a judicial action the 
invalidity of any patent for which the 
licensee has obtained a license. Any 
agreement between the parties to a 
patent license agreement which pur-
ports to bar the licensee from asserting 
the invalidity of any licensed patent 
shall be unenforceable as to that provi-
sion. 
(b) Any patent license agreement may 
provide for a party or parties to the 
agreement to terminate the license if 
the licensee asserts in a judicial action 
invalidity of the licensed patent, and, if 
the licensee has such a right to ter-
minate, the agreement may further 
provide that the licensee's obligations 
under the agreement shall continue 
until final and unappealable deter-
mination of invalidity is reached or 
until the license is terminated. Such an 
agreement shall not be unenforceable 
as to such provisions on the grounds 
that such provisions are contrary to 
federal law or policy. 
Subsection (a) of the proposed statute 
would codify the demise of the doctrine of 
licensee estoppel that was effected by the 
Supreme Court in Lear v. Adkins. 92 Sub-
section (b) however, subverts part of the 
holding in Lear. The section would allow 
a patent license to provide for the 
licensee's obligations under the contract to 
continue until the patent is finally declared 
invalid or until the license is terminated; 
such a provision was held unenforceable in 
Lear. 
Subsection (b) also embraces the deci-
sions in Cordis and Universal The statute 
would expand upon the decision in Cordis 
allowing a licensor to terminate an agree-
ment for nonpayment of royalties by al-
lowing the parties to a licensing agreement 
to provide for termination of the agree-
ment when the licensee challenges the 
validity of the licensed patent, even if the 
licensee has not stopped making royalty 
payments. The freedqm to provide for ter-
mination upon a patent challenge and for 
royalty obligations to continue until final 
resolution is a Congressional recognition 
of the parties right to contract expressed in 
Uniwrsal 
VI. CONCLUSION 
America has grown to be a world power 
in such a relatively short time partly due to 
the competitive nature of its people. This 
competitiveness has been stimulated and 
nurtured by granting rewards for inven-
tiveness, the rights specified in the Patent 
Act. At times, however, the patent 
owner's use· of these rights has been found 
to transgress the federal patent policy. 
Even seemingly legitimate uses of the 
patent monopoly may be ruled as inconsis-
tent with federal patent policy. 
Where the legislature has failed to deal 
with these transgressions, the federal courts 
have developed federal common law. Fed-
eral common law was not abolished by the 
Erie decision; in fact, in the field of patent 
licensing agreements it is growing at a rapid 
rate. The area of royalty payments appears 
to be where the growth will be most abun-
dant; there are still a number of questions 
regarding royalties that have been raised 
but not yet answered. 
The newly proposed legislation is a sign 
that Congress is aware of the need to 
address these questions and more clearly 
defme what "federal patent policy" is; and 
thereby, decrease the need for the courts to 
fill in the gaps. 
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